Fair housing in Lynn: who a landlord may not refuse, what may not be asked, and where a complaint goes

Massachusetts answers the question 'may a landlord say no to me because of this?' with two lists, written into c.151B §4, and most of what a Lynn renter needs is in them: the grounds a landlord may not use, the questions a landlord may not ask on an application, the advertisement a landlord may not run, and the children and disability rules that fill in the rest. The exemptions are real but narrow — an owner-occupied two-family, housing built for older persons, a religious organization's own housing — and the clocks are short: 300 days to file with the state commission, three years to sue. This page quotes each rule from the statute and says where a complaint goes. Refusing a voucher, accommodations and assistance animals, and what a background check may weigh each have a page of their own.

What this page is: the protected-class lists, the questions and advertisements the law forbids, the rules for children and for disability modifications, the exemptions that genuinely exist, and the filing deadlines — for a Lynn rental, each quoted from and linked to its official text. It is not legal advice. Three neighbours of this page own their own corners and are linked rather than repeated: refusing a voucher or other income, accommodations in rules and assistance animals, and what a screening may consider. Where a rule could not be read from a primary source, the page says so instead of guessing.

Nothing on this page changes what a Lynn apartment costs: at the current average of $2,342/month (September 2026 — how we compute this), a refusal that the law forbids is still a refusal, and the remedies below are the only ones that put the apartment, or its value, back. What the page does change is the list of reasons a landlord may lawfully give for a “no,” and the list of questions a renter may decline to answer.

The list: the reasons a Lynn landlord may not use — c.151B §4(6) and §4(7)

Massachusetts writes the list twice, for two kinds of housing, and the two lists are nearly identical. Paragraph 6 of c.151B §4 covers “publicly assisted or multiple dwelling or contiguously located housing accommodations” — a multiple dwelling being a building rented to “three or more families living independently of each other” (§1(11)) — and paragraph 7 covers “other covered housing accommodations,” which §1(13) defines as housing “made generally available to the public for sale or lease or rental, by advertising in a newspaper or otherwise, by posting of a sign or signs or a notice or notices on the premises or elsewhere, by listing with a broker, or by any other means of public offering.” Between them that is close to every Lynn apartment a stranger can find. In each, it is an unlawful practice “to refuse to rent or lease or sell or negotiate for sale or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person or group of persons such accommodations because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation,” age, “genetic information, ancestry, or marital status,” veteran or armed-forces status, blindness, hearing impairment, or because the person “has any other handicap” — and, separately, “to discriminate against any person” on those grounds “in the terms, conditions or privileges of such accommodations.” Two definitions in §1 decide who is on the list. Age “includes any duration of time since an individual's birth of greater than forty years” (§1(8)), and the housing paragraphs add that the word “shall not apply to persons who are minors” — so a landlord may still say no to a seventeen-year-old on that ground. Handicap means “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 1 or more major life activities of a person,” a record of one, or being regarded as having one, and includes the lawful, prescribed taking of medication for an opioid-use disorder (§1(17)); current illegal drug use is excluded in words. Two more grounds sit in neighbouring paragraphs and have their own pages: having children (§4(11), below) and paying with public assistance or a housing subsidy (§4(10), on the voucher page). Nothing in these paragraphs names immigration status, source of income by that phrase, or a criminal record — Massachusetts gives a renter procedure rather than a protected class on records, as the background-checks page explains. Federal law underneath is shorter: 42 U.S.C. §3604(a) forbids refusing a dwelling “because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” and §3604(f) adds handicap — which is why a Lynn complaint usually runs on the state statute. Source: M.G.L. c.151B §4 — unlawful practices (housing: paragraphs 6, 7, 7A, 7B, 10, 11) · M.G.L. c.151B §1 — definitions (age, handicap, the four kinds of housing) · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

What may not be asked on the application, and what may not be advertised — §4(6)(c), §4(7)(c), §4(7B)

The same two paragraphs reach the application form. Clause (c) of each makes it unlawful “to cause to be made any written or oral inquiry or record concerning the race, religious creed, color, national origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation,” age, genetic information, ancestry or marital status, veteran status, blindness, hearing impairment or other handicap “of the person seeking to rent or lease or buy any such accommodation.” That is a rule about the question, not only the decision: a landlord who asks where you were born, whether you are married, or what your disability is has already done the thing the statute names, whatever happens next. The advertising rule, §4(7B), is broader in two ways. It reaches “any person” — not only owners and agents — who makes, prints or publishes “any notice, statement or advertisement” for the sale or rental of covered housing “that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation” … “national origin, genetic information, ancestry, children, marital status, public assistance recipiency, or handicap or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination except where otherwise legally permitted.” Its list names children and public-assistance recipiency in words, so 'no kids' and 'no Section 8' in a listing are each a violation of this paragraph on their own, whatever the landlord would have decided in person. Federal §3604(c) runs alongside it and, as the exemptions section below explains, is the one federal rule that even an exempt owner-occupant must obey. Source: M.G.L. c.151B §4 — paragraphs 6(c), 7(c) and 7B · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

Children: §4(11), its three exemptions, and the lead-paint rule that closes the loophole — c.111 §199A

Paragraph 11 is the children rule, and it covers all four kinds of housing at once: it is unlawful “to refuse to rent or lease or sell or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person such accommodations because such person has a child or children who shall occupy the premises with such person,” and unlawful to discriminate “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such accommodations” — a higher deposit or a 'no ground floor' rule for families is the same violation as a refusal. The paragraph keeps one ordinary limit: “nothing herein shall limit the applicability of any local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of persons permitted to occupy a dwelling,” so a genuine occupancy code applies to a family as to anyone else. It then lists exactly three exemptions. First, “Dwellings containing three apartments or less, one of which apartments is occupied by an elderly or infirm person for whom the presence of children would constitute a hardship,” elderly meaning sixty-five or over. Second, the temporary lease of an owner's own home during an absence “not to exceed one year.” Third, “The leasing of a single dwelling unit in a two family dwelling, the other occupancy unit of which is occupied by the owner as his residence.” In Lynn's pre-1978 housing stock the refusal usually arrives dressed as a lead-paint worry, and the Legislature closed that door in c.111 §199A: “Refusing to rent to families with children in violation of paragraph eleven of section four of chapter one hundred and fifty-one B shall not constitute compliance with the lead law and regulations,” and refusing to renew or evicting a family with children “shall not constitute compliance” either — that eviction is also a violation of c.93A §2 and c.186 §18 by the section's own terms. §199A(a) goes further than children: refusing anyone because the premises “do or may contain” lead, or because the rental “would trigger duties” under the lead law, is an unlawful practice under c.151B in its own right. When a commission or court finds discrimination against children in a home with dangerous lead levels, §4(11) orders that “notification of such finding shall be sent to the director of the childhood lead poisoning prevention program.” Federal law calls the same class familial status (§3604(a)) and keeps the same occupancy carve-out in §3607(b)(1). The deleading duty itself, and what a tenant of a pre-1978 Lynn home must be handed, are on the lead-paint page. Source: M.G.L. c.151B §4(11) — children · M.G.L. c.111 §199A — refusing to rent because of lead paint · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3607 — religious organizations, private clubs, housing for older persons (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

Disability: the modification is your right, who pays depends on the building, and the rent may not be higher — §4(7A)

For a tenant with a disability the state statute spells out the physical changes a landlord must allow. §4(7A)(1) makes it discrimination to refuse “to permit or to make, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modification of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modification is necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of such premises.” The default is that the tenant pays — with a tier Massachusetts adds and federal law does not: “in the case of publicly assisted housing, multiple dwelling housing consisting of ten or more units, or contiguously located housing consisting of ten or more units, reasonable modification shall be at the expense of the owner or other person having the right of ownership.” The statute's own examples of a reasonable modification are “installing raised numbers which may be read by a sight-impaired person, installing a door bell which flashes a light for a hearing-impaired person, lowering a cabinet, ramping a front entrance of five or fewer vertical steps, widening a doorway, and installing a grab bar,” and it draws the owner's cost line at the ramp: the owner “shall not be required to pay for ramping a front entrance of more than five steps or for installing a wheelchair lift.” Where the tenant pays, the landlord may — only “where the modification to be paid for by the handicapped person will materially alter the marketability of the housing” — condition permission “on the tenant agreeing to restore or pay for the cost of restoring, the interior of the premises to the condition that existed prior to such modification, reasonable wear and tear excepted.” Where the owner pays, an “undue hardship” is a defense, weighed on the cost, the effect on marketability, and the size of the owner's housing business; and the owner's duty to fund wheelchair-accessible units caps at ten percent of them. Two sentences protect the money. §4(7A)(3) makes it discrimination to refuse to rent “because of such person's need for reasonable modification or accommodation” — the need itself may not be the reason for a 'no.' And the paragraph's last line: “there shall not be established or imposed a rent or other charge for such handicap-accessible housing which is higher than the rent or other charge for comparable nonaccessible housing.” The federal regulation, 24 CFR 100.203, adds the deposit rule the state text lacks — “The landlord may not increase for handicapped persons any customarily required security deposit” — though it allows an interest-bearing escrow for a restoration the tenant has agreed to, with the interest the tenant's; and its grab-bar example says a landlord may require the bars removed at move-out but that “it would be unreasonable for the landlord to require the tenant to remove the blocking” inside the wall. A change to a rule rather than to the building — a no-pets clause, an assigned space, a different payment date — is a reasonable accommodation under §4(7A)(2) and belongs on the pets page. The accommodation route, and the animal rules, are on the pets and assistance-animals page. Source: M.G.L. c.151B §4(7A) — handicap: modifications, accommodations, cost, rent · 24 CFR 100.203 — reasonable modifications of existing premises (LII) · 42 U.S.C. §3604 — discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

The exemptions that exist: the owner-occupied two-family, housing for older persons, religious housing — and the one rule that survives all of them

The exemption most Lynn renters will meet is written into §4(7): “this subsection shall not apply to the leasing of a single apartment or flat in a two family dwelling, the other occupancy unit of which is occupied by the owner as his residence.” Read it narrowly, because the statute does: it is a two-family, the owner lives in the other unit, and it exempts only paragraph 7 (the children paragraph has its own, identical carve-out, listed above). Paragraph 6 — publicly assisted, three-or-more-family and contiguously located housing — carries no owner-occupancy exemption at all, so a three-decker with the owner on the first floor is covered. The age clause has a carve-out of its own: the word “shall not apply to persons who are minors nor to residency in state-aided or federally-aided housing developments for the elderly,” nor to tax-credit housing or communities “constructed expressly for use as housing for persons 55 years of age or over or 62 years of age or over,” which the statute requires to comply with the federal Act. Federal law draws the owner-occupied line wider — four units: §3604 does not apply to “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence” (§3603(b)(2)) — but a Lynn landlord with a three- or four-family answers to the state statute, which has no such exemption for those buildings. The federal exemption is also conditioned on the advertising rule: §3603(b) opens with “Nothing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c)) shall apply to,” so an exempt owner-occupant who publishes a discriminatory ad is still liable under §3604(c). Housing for older persons is exempt from the familial-status rules federally when it is “intended for, and solely occupied by, persons 62 years of age or older,” or operated for 55-and-over where “at least 80 percent of the occupied units are occupied by at least one person who is 55 years of age or older” and the community publishes policies to that effect (§3607(b)(2)); and a religious organization may limit non-commercial housing it owns “to persons of the same religion” unless membership in that religion is itself restricted by race, color or national origin (§3607(a)). Source: M.G.L. c.151B §4 — paragraphs 6, 7 (two-family proviso, age clause) and 11 · 42 U.S.C. §3603 — effective dates and exemptions (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3607 — religious organizations, private clubs, housing for older persons (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror)

Where to file, and the clocks: 300 days at MCAD, three years in court, one year at HUD — and Lynn's own commission

The state route starts at the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, and the deadline is fixed by §5: “Any complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so filed within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination.” A court case is the second route, under §9: a person claiming to be aggrieved may, “at the expiration of ninety days after the filing of a complaint with the commission, or sooner if a commissioner assents in writing, but not later than three years after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, bring a civil action for damages or injunctive relief or both in the superior or probate court” for the county, “or in the housing court within whose district the alleged unlawful practice occurred if the unlawful practice involves residential housing.” The federal route: a complaint to HUD “not later than one year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated” (§3610(a)), or a civil action in federal or state court “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice” (§3613(a)). Lynn has a commission of its own. The Lynn Human Rights Commission takes written complaints “signed under the pains and penalties of perjury,” by mail or in person at City Hall (Room 408, 3 City Hall Square; 781-586-6740), and says that “Complaints must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of the discriminatory act or the last date of an alleged continuing discriminatory practice.” Read what it is: the city's page describes investigation and mediation, and says that “If mediation fails to resolve the complaint, the Commission may refer the complainant to the Attorney General, Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, or other appropriate agencies.” It is a local door, not a substitute for the state clock — filing in Lynn does not stop the 300 days running. Whichever door you use, retaliation for using it is its own violation: federal §3617 makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of” a fair-housing right. The state's own retaliation rule, and the presumption that runs in the tenant's favour, are on the retaliation page. Source: M.G.L. c.151B §5 — complaints to MCAD, 300 days · M.G.L. c.151B §9 — civil action, three years, Housing Court · Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · Lynn Human Rights Commission — complaint process (lynnma.gov) · HUD — file a fair housing complaint · 42 U.S.C. §3610 — complaint to HUD within one year (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3613 — civil action within two years (U.S. House) · … at Cornell LII (mirror) · 42 U.S.C. §3617 — interference, coercion, or intimidation (LII)

What this page does not know

Honest caveat: no public dataset counts fair-housing complaints filed about Lynn rentals in a given year, so there are no local figures on this page — only the rules and their sources. The Massachusetts regulations under c.151B (804 CMR) were not read — the only mirror this site can fetch carries a single section — and we read no court or MCAD decision on any paragraph quoted here, so the page cannot say how 'reasonable,' 'undue hardship,' or 'materially alter the marketability' have been applied in practice. The Lynn Human Rights Ordinance is quoted only as the city's own web page reprints it; the ordinance's complaint provisions were not read in the ordinance itself. MCAD's website refuses automated fetches, so its procedures are cited by name and not quoted. Whether a particular Lynn building counts as 'publicly assisted,' 'multiple dwelling,' 'contiguously located,' or 'other covered' housing under §1 depends on its ownership and history, which no public dataset answers. Where the page says a rule is silent, that is a statement about the text we read, not a promise that no other rule exists.

Where this usually goes next

A refusal because of a voucher or other assistance has its own statute and its own page: refusing vouchers. A request to change a rule — a no-pets clause, a parking space, a payment date — is an accommodation, and it lives with the animal rules on the pets and assistance-animals page. What a landlord may pull and weigh from your record is on the background-checks page. The lead-paint rules that a “no children” refusal usually hides behind are on the lead-paint page. If the trouble started after you complained, the retaliation page has the presumption that protects you. The whole set of guides, grouped by stage, is on the tenant-rights page; each Lynn ZIP's current average (01905, 01902, 01901) says what the apartment you were refused would have cost.

Page last updated November 1, 2026 · rent index data through September 2026.